The History of Fisker Automotive

A Symphony of Disappointment: The Rise and Fall of Fisker Automotive

The American automotive landscape is a graveyard of dreams, filled with the rusting chassis of companies that promised revolution but delivered only ruin. Few stories in this graveyard are as poignant, as dramatic, or as ultimately cautionary as that of Fisker Automotive. Spanning two distinct eras, the company’s history is a tale of two founders, two financial collapses, and a persistent struggle to turn automotive art into a viable business. From the sun-drenched optimism of Southern California to the cold reality of bankruptcy auctions, the saga of Fisker is a testament to the brutal difficulty of manufacturing electric vehicles in the modern era.

The Genesis: Henrik Fisker and the Karma

Fisker Automotive was founded in 2007 by Henrik Fisker, a Danish-American designer with a resume that read like a “who’s who” of automotive luxury. Before starting his own venture, Fisker was the creative force behind iconic vehicles such as the BMW Z8 and the Aston Martin DB9. His vision was not merely to build a car, but to create a rolling piece of art that also happened to be a plug-in hybrid.

The company’s flagship vehicle, the Fisker Karma, was unveiled at the 2008 North American International Auto Show in Detroit. It was a masterpiece of design: a low-slung, four-door luxury coupe with “frog-eye” headlights and a roofline that swept backward with predatory elegance. Underneath the sculpted aluminum and carbon fiber body lay a complex powertrain. The Karma was not a pure battery-electric vehicle like the Tesla Model S, which was being developed concurrently. Instead, it utilized a series-hybrid system. A small, turbocharged 2.0-liter GM-sourced Ecotec engine acted solely as a generator, charging a lithium-ion battery pack that powered two electric motors on the rear axle. This gave the car a range of roughly 50 miles on pure electric power before the gasoline engine kicked in, extending the total range to about 300 miles.

The concept struck a chord. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, consumers were looking for “green” luxury that didn’t sacrifice style. The Karma was positioned as an eco-conscious supercar, a statement of wealth and environmental awareness. Pre-orders flooded in, and the company seemed poised for success.

The First Crash: Manufacturing and Financial Woes

Despite the hype, Fisker Automotive faced immediate and catastrophic hurdles. Unlike Tesla, which elected to build its own factory in Fremont, California, Fisker opted to outsource manufacturing. They contracted with Valmet Automotive in Finland, a company known for assembling the Porsche Boxster. While Valmet had high build quality, the logistics were a nightmare. Shipping heavy vehicles across the Atlantic drove up costs and created supply chain vulnerabilities.

Furthermore, the Karma’s complex hybrid powertrain proved difficult to perfect. In 2011, just as deliveries were beginning, the company faced its first major crisis. A fire broke out at a Fisker-owned warehouse in California, destroying approximately 100 vehicles awaiting shipment to dealers. Investigations later pointed to a faulty battery pack design provided by A123 Systems, Fisker’s battery supplier. This was the beginning of a domino effect of technical failures.

Throughout 2012 and 2013, the Karma suffered from a litany of issues: software glitches, cooling system failures, and in some cases, complete loss of power while driving. Consumer Reports famously purchased a Karma for testing, only to have the car break down repeatedly in their driveway. The magazine later declared the Karma “unreliable,” a death knell for a luxury car brand.

Simultaneously, the U.S. government was undergoing a shift in policy. The Department of Energy (DOE) had granted Fisker a $529 million low-interest loan in 2010 to help build the Karma and develop a more affordable sedan. However, as the political climate shifted and the Tea Party movement gained traction, Fisker became a target for criticism regarding government spending on private companies. When the Republican-led House Oversight Committee investigated Fisker in 2011 and 2012, citing missed production targets and concerns over Fisker’s move to assemble the Karma in Finland rather than the U.S., the DOE froze the remaining funds.

The company burned through cash at an alarming rate. In 2013, facing a liquidity crisis and mounting recall repairs, Fisker was forced to halt production. In March 2013, the company laid off 75% of its workforce and sought a buyer.

The Buyout: The Wanxiang Group Era

Fisker Automotive officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2013. At a bankruptcy auction in February 2014, the company was purchased by the Wanxiang Group, China’s largest auto parts manufacturer, for $149.2 million. Wanxiang had been a supplier to Fisker and was keen to enter the automotive manufacturing sector. Wanxiang also acquired A123 Systems, the battery maker, simultaneously, effectively taking control of Fisker’s entire supply chain.

Under Wanxiang’s ownership, the company was rebranded as “Fisker Inc.” (dropping the “Automotive” moniker). The headquarters moved from Anaheim, California, to the heart of Silicon Valley in Palo Alto to be closer to tech talent and investors. The new entity aimed to finish the development of the second-generation vehicle, originally codenamed “Project Nina.”

The Second Act: The Fisker Ocean

While the first iteration of the company focused on a complex hybrid, the new Fisker Inc. pivoted toward pure battery-electric vehicles (BEVs). In January 2020, at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, Henrik Fisker unveiled the Fisker Ocean.

The Ocean was a stark departure from the Karma. It was a fully electric, all-wheel-drive SUV targeting the mass market, with a projected starting price of $37,499 (before incentives). The design featured Fisker’s signature “Tiger Face” front end and a solar roof that could add up to 20 miles of range per day in ideal conditions. One of the most innovative features was “California Mode,” a software-controlled function that lowered all eight windows and opened the panoramic roof simultaneously at the touch of a button.

The “Ocean One” Launch and Production Struggles

Fisker Inc. went public in 2020 via a SPAC (Special Purpose Acquisition Company) merger with Spartan Energy Acquisition Corp., raising significant capital. Pre-orders for the Ocean began to climb, reaching over 60,000 by 2022.

However, history began to repeat itself. In November 2022, Fisker began production of the Ocean at the Graz, Austria, factory, operated by Magna Steyr (a contract manufacturer owned by Magna International). The first batch of vehicles, the limited edition “Fisker Ocean One,” were highly anticipated. But as deliveries began in 2023, a new wave of issues emerged.

Tesla, the market leader, issued price cuts that put pressure on the Ocean’s value proposition. More critically, early reviews of the Ocean revealed significant software instability. In August 2023, Consumer Reports published a review citing “major software bugs,” warning messages that were difficult to decipher, and door handles that occasionally failed to present themselves to the driver. Furthermore, the One-Pedal Driving mode, a key feature for EV efficiency, was not performing smoothly, causing jarring acceleration changes.

While the physical build quality of the Magna-produced vehicles was generally praised, the software failed to meet the standards set by modern competitors. Fisker scrambled to issue over-the-air (OTA) updates, but the company’s financial runway was shrinking.

The Final Collapse: 2024

Despite Henrik Fisker’s optimism, the company faced a liquidity crisis in early 2024. Fisker Inc. had never turned a profit, and the capital required to develop the next generation of vehicles (the Fisker Pear and Fisker Ronin) was immense. In March 2024, Fisker announced it was cutting 15% of its workforce to preserve cash.

The breaking point came shortly after. In mid-March 2024, Fisker paused production at the Graz factory to manage inventory. A potential lifeline appeared in the form of a merger agreement with Nissan, which would have invested $400 million to co-develop an electric platform. However, the deal fell through at the last moment.

Unable to secure emergency funding, Fisker Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 17, 2024, in the District of Delaware. This marked the second bankruptcy for a Fisker-branded entity in a decade.

The American Perspective: Reception and Milestones

Throughout its history, Fisker’s reception in the United States was polarized. Initially, the Karma was embraced by Hollywood elites and eco-conscious billionaires. It won the 2012 Green Car of the Year award and secured the 2012 North American Car of the Year title (awarded at the Detroit Auto Show). These accolades were significant milestones, proving the design was world-class.

However, the ownership experience soured quickly. The Karma’s interior, while beautiful, was criticized for poor ergonomics and usability. The rear seats were cramped, and the trunk was virtually nonexistent due to the battery placement. The high price (around $110,000 to $125,000) meant expectations were sky-high, and the reliability issues caused a massive backlash.

For the Fisker Ocean, American reception was initially enthusiastic due to the aggressive pricing and design. It was seen as a potential “Tesla killer.” However, as software issues persisted and service centers were slow to ramp up, consumer trust evaporated. The brand’s reputation for reliability was permanently damaged.

The Vehicles

First Vehicle: The Fisker Karma (2011–2012).

• U.S. Sales: Approximately 2,045 units total (including the extended range Karma and the low-volume Karma Revero).
• Production Notes: The Karma was discontinued in 2012, after which a low-volume company called Karma Automotive (separate from Fisker) acquired the remains of the design to produce the Revero.

Latest Vehicle: The Fisker Ocean (2023–2024).

• U.S. Sales: In 2023, approximately 2,111 units were delivered. In 2024, before the bankruptcy, sales were minimal and declined sharply as the company halted operations.
• Global Sales: The Ocean was sold in the US, Europe, and Canada. Total global sales for 2023 were roughly 3,670 units.

Most Popular Vehicle: The Fisker Ocean. While the Ocean outsold the Karma in terms of volume, its “popularity” is complex. It was the most accessible vehicle, garnering over 65,000 reservations globally at its peak. However, due to production constraints and the subsequent bankruptcy, the delivery rate was low. The Ocean represented the company’s best chance at mass-market success, but it ultimately fell victim to the same operational issues that plagued the Karma.

Factory Operations and Racing

Fisker did not own traditional factories in the United States. This was a distinct difference from Ford or GM. The original Karma was built by Valmet in Finland. The Ocean was built by Magna Steyr in Graz, Austria. This contract manufacturing model allowed Fisker to avoid billions in capital expenditures on factory construction but left them vulnerable to scheduling conflicts and production costs controlled by partners.

Regarding racing, Fisker did not have a major factory-backed racing program. However, the company did engage in marketing stunts involving high-speed runs. In 2013, Fisker attempted a land-speed record with a modified Karma at the Bonneville Salt Flats, reaching 165 mph to prove the thermal stability of the battery pack. For the Ocean, Fisker partnered with the Formula E electric racing series as a sponsor to build brand awareness, but they never developed a competitive racing program like Porsche or BMW.

Why Fisker Was Different

Fisker’s primary differentiator was design. Henrik Fisker is a stylist first and a businessman second. The Karma remains one of the most beautiful cars of the 21st century, a “coachbuilt” look in a sea of plastic appliances. Fisker also prioritized sustainability in materials. The Ocean used recycled ocean plastics, vegan interiors, and solar technology, pushing the “planet-first” ethos further than almost any other manufacturer.

However, this focus on aesthetics and green materials often came at the expense of practical engineering. While Tesla prioritized battery management software and manufacturing efficiency, Fisker focused on the silhouette of the car.

Conclusion: The Current Status and Outlook

As of late 2024, Fisker Inc. is defunct. Following the Chapter 11 filing, the company is in the process of liquidating its assets. The intellectual property, including the design of the Ocean and the Pear (a planned subcompact crossover), is being auctioned off. Potential buyers have included major automakers and investment firms, but no entity has stepped forward to revive the brand as a whole.

Henrik Fisker has stated he intends to continue his career in the automotive sector, likely focusing on design consulting rather than full-scale manufacturing. For the consumer, the fallout continues. Thousands of Ocean owners are left with vehicles that still operate, but for how long is uncertain. Without a corporate entity to provide over-the-air updates, service parts, or warranty support, the Fisker Ocean risks becoming an orphan vehicle—a piece of rolling art that eventually grinds to a halt, much like the company that created it.

The legacy of Fisker is a bittersweet one. It serves as a stark reminder that in the automotive industry, beauty alone cannot sustain a company. Manufacturing a car is a marathon of logistics, engineering, and financial discipline—a marathon that Henrik Fisker, twice, could not quite finish.